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In Unconditional Equality, Skaria achieves that most improbable and difficult of goals – 
to write with originality and inventiveness about Gandhi.  Gandhian scholarship has passed 
through several well-trodden paths, and as Skaria tracks, some have been more productive 
than others.  For example, there is the liberal appropriation, in which Gandhian non-violence is 
translated as an internal critique of imperfect but perfectible institutions, coupled to an implicit 
reaffirmation of the state’s monopoly of violence. In contrast, Skaria’s work joins an exciting 
counter-tradition of scholarship that has refused to shy away from Gandhi’s insistence on 
religion as a condition of politics.  Yet, even as Skaria joins this tradition of scholarship, he 
travels further down the rabbit hole of Gandhi’s conservatism that most others have ventured. 
 
This requires some elaboration.  Unconditional Equality is animated through and 
through by Gandhi’s rejection of theological secularism.  By such a theological secularism, 
Skaria means the familiar and fabular division between public reason and the private faith, or 
more precisely, the modern grounding of faith and sovereignty in autonomous reason.  In the 
shadow of this tradition, Gandhi’s insistence on a politics grounded in faith and religious 
categories (rather than the other way around) have led to readings of him as untimely, 
romantic, traditionally conservative and/or communitarian.  For Skaria, the most convincing of 
such prior readings are those in the tradition of subaltern studies that describe Gandhi’s ability 
to open up a vast peasant-communal consciousness for appropriation by bourgeoisie 
nationalism.  Yet, as the same tradition of work recognized, the disjuncture between the 
message of the Mahatma, Gandhi’s thought, and the practices of nationalism were never 
closed.  The gap between religion and politics, between private conscience and public 
responsibility, remained a domain of unfinished negotiations. 
 
The originality of Skaria’s intervention in Unconditional Equality (and indeed his 
departure from much previous scholarship) is to dwell within this vast gap, where available 
concepts such as liberalism, conservatism, secularism, fundamentalism, and nationalism find 
themselves inadequate to the task of measuring Gandhian thought.  While Skaria recognizes 
Gandhi’s willingness to ally with such political traditions, Skaria goes beyond their categories as 
anchoring points.  What sets Gandhian thought apart is his insistent refusal of any politics of 
sovereignty – grounded as they might be towards the ends of reason, faith, secular freedom or 
divine realization.  Thus unmoored, Skaria argues that to understand Gandhi’s thought requires 
an exit not only from liberal and secular problematics, but from theological and communitarian 
ones as well. And as becomes clear, such a complete exit from sovereignty, and its consequent 
upturning of conceptual vocabularies, leads to a sort of derangement of thought, an 
impropriety and uprooting of being from which there is no return.  It is this space that Skaria 
makes his own. 
 
For Skaria, it is this radical (in the sense of a deep uprooting) orientation of Gandhi’s 
thought that renders it durably resistant to the widest range of available philosophical 
categories.  While perhaps resonating most closely with modern conservatism, in aspiration to 
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ultimately destroy any sovereign form, it arrives at a new kind of equality – unconditional and 
immeasurable –that finally uproots even conservative traditions.  Most proper to Gandhian 
thought is then its orientation towards a radical equality with all being (life not limited by 
shifting liberal configurations of the animal-human), coupled to a practice of surrender that 
rejects subordination to sovereign forms – be they of faith or reason.  The telos of satyagraha, 
even as it rejects the thought of telos, is the transaction of a pure gift: an unconditional 
disavowal of the self that is neither comprehensible within liberal vocabularies of rights and 
freedoms, nor assimilable to conservative traditions of faith and hierarchy.   
 
No doubt, this is a politics built on confrontation with sovereignty, cohering most clearly 
in the moment of its rejection of sovereign forms.  It is no surprise then that outside the terms 
of such a confrontation, Gandhi’s thinking does not give itself over easily to systematicity or 
coherence. More precisely, the satyagrahi’s life is a constant practice of self-ciphering, of the 
transformation of the self so that it may be sacrificed without intention, without even its own 
or the recipient’s knowledge of such a surrender. True to this force, Skaria draws out the 
immense inconsistencies, contradictions and incompleteness within Gandhi’s writings – as it 
shapes and reshapes itself across his lifetime and his two languages – Gujarati and English.  
Thus, Skaria’s achievement is not the discovery of an ‘early’, ‘late’, ‘Gujarati’ and/or ‘English’ 
Gandhi.  Rather, what Skaria achieves is a rendition of Gandhi that does not shy away from 
dwelling in the dizzying orientation of Gandhi’s thought that propels itself towards its own 
destruction, and in so doing, enacts the destruction of familiar philosophical concepts.  Its 
horizon is a vertiginous non-conceptuality, non-thought rather than the self-knowledge proper 
to other traditions of askesis. 
 
Such a fundamental exit from problematics of faith, reason, self-formation and 
sovereignty opens Gandhi’s writing up to some of Skaria’s most fascinating readings.  Take for 
example his reading of the machine and automaticity.  Gandhi’s criticism of machines in Hind 
Swaraj is well-known: simultaneously a critique of colonial deindustrialization, as well as of the 
machine as an abstract means that masters both the object that is its end, and the subject that 
wields it.  But what is the self-ciphering of the satyagrahi if not itself a kind of machinic 
automaton?  The pure gift of the satyagrahi demands a non-knowledge of giving and receiving, 
beyond intention and debt.  It follows then that it is only as a machine set into automatic 
motion, devoted to the task at hand, that the satyagrahi can truly become inert, non-knowing, 
sacrificing not only the self, but also self-mastery.  This is far from the machine as instrumental 
means to an end in Hind Swaraj; rather, it is a new thought of a machinic automaton that 
dissolves the instrumental relation itself.  In other words, while this is not a submission to the 
machine as an abstract means, it is submission nonetheless: a seizure of self through 
automaticity after an intense abjuration of free-will, choice, action and autonomy.   
 
The broader implications of such a reading of Gandhi radically reformulates the means-
end question.  In Skaria’s reading, when calculable ends are pursued with an incalculable 
intensity, ends may themselves become suffused with incalculability.  It is this intense pursuit of 
incalculable surrender (beyond means-end as given, towards a ‘pure means’) that allows him to 
align his sadhana of spinning and ahimsa with Hitler’s sadhana of war, or even the British 
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pursuit of colonial rule.  Skaria shifts emphasis away from the means-end question to this 
process through which their duality is overcome.  In such a reading, non-violence shifts from 
the center of Gandhi’s politics.  Indeed, Gandhi is able to admire Raja Harischandra’s mythic 
near execution of his beloved Taramati, because in that act, Harischandra surrenders his own 
will, desire and attachment to a greater faith.  At one level, this is a counter-reading of Gandhi 
that works against prior scholarship that emphasize the tight-knit relation between means and 
ends, such that his insistence on means becomes a non-compulsory exemplary politics.  At 
another, it is also a move away from a criticism of such readings that instead pose the means-
end relation as intensely dialogic, where attentiveness to means becomes an externally-
directed vigilance of shifting political consequences.  The exit from the problematics of 
sovereignty and agency, decision and consequence could not be more complete.   
 
Not self-contained, not consequentialist, but untimely. Skaria’s shift of emphasis from 
Gandhi the actor to Gandhi the writer is tied up with his discernment of Gandhi’s desire to exit 
from contemporaneous (and contemporary) problematics.  As Skaria is well aware, Gandhi’s 
thought comes across then as untimely in a double sense: at odds with the theological 
secularism of his and our time, and at odds with his political and personal practice on the other.  
Skaria gestures at these misalignments, describing its untimeliness as a shadow summoning our 
readings, as ‘exceeding’ his and our time, as a recessive force ‘bursting forth’ from his explicit 
formulations.  And as Skaria acknowledges, this shadow that threatens to break forth is a 
discomforting force, testing Skaria’s commitment to the ‘secular inheritance’ he has no desire 
to abandon.   What then are the stakes of this almost too faithful reading of Gandhi’s writing 
and thought?  This is a question that Skaria must inevitably confront (along with many projects 
that push the contradictions within liberal secularism).  And of course, there is the problem of 
‘reading’ Gandhi from the vantage point of the secular tradition in the first place.  Skaria 
describes Gandhi’s practices of reading (where what is read is less important than how it is 
read) as a reframing of the relationship between reader and text (the transformation of the 
hermeneut into the devout bhakt) which in the end, is the dissolution of secular reading.  Yet, is 
is precisely this confrontation between secular and non-secular practices of writing, reading 
and thinking that gives this book its force. 
 
Skaria is of course no apologist for Gandhi: his discussion of Gandhi’s commitment to 
propriety and place does not disguise the caste and gender domination instituted and reified by 
the practice of satyagraha.  Read from the perspective of the contemporary, what might we 
make of this rendering of Gandhi’s thought?  What Skaria allows us a glimpse of in Gandhi is a 
force of thought whose horizon is its own undoing, as well as the undoing of the fundaments of 
theological secularism.   In this, it is allied with, but not reducible to anti-foundationalist 
thought within Euro-American philosophy.  But further, it provincializes Euro-American reason 
by not only pushing against its internal contradictions, but by entirely exiting the problematic 
and producing another universalism.  If Spivak cautions that Derridian “deconstruction cannot 
found a political program of any kind” other than the work of decentering, perhaps offered 
here is another way?  Skaria’s reading of Gandhi offers a possibility of a politics of faith and 
conviction that observes a radical notion of equality without measure.  It opens up a space for 
faith and conviction in the public sphere, without grounding it (necessarily) in a religious order.  
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In its own autoimmunity (a feature it shares with liberal secularism), it espouses a radical 
equality with all thought and being.  And, getting past the self-delusion of liberal secularism of 
its own groundlessness, it grounds such a commitment to radical equality in faith.  Religious 
faith, certainly, but a faith that allows for no exercise of sovereign domination – be that of its 
own, or of other forms.  At a time when conservative movements across the world seem to 
have become custodians of political faith and conviction, while the liberal hope of limiting faith 
to the private sphere seems to be coming undone, might such a reading not open up a different 
reordering of the relation between politics and affect?  Of course, such a temptation is as 
dangerous as it is attractive, and is by no means what Skaria suggests.  And perhaps this is 
asking for too much, or really, for too little: the discovery here is perhaps not of new answers, 
but something rarer, a new way of asking old questions. 
 
Finally, I must mention another fascinating thread of ideas that Skaria alludes to: the 
notion that Gandhian thought practices a ‘ruination of the concept’.  Through the text, Skaria 
sometimes uses concept as simply Gandhi’s concept of x, but at other times, where under the 
force of Gandhi’s thinking, the notion of ‘concepts’ (within quotes) reveal the imprint of their 
own duress.  Alongwith ‘ruined’ concepts, there are also fascinating gestures to ‘concept-
metaphors’ ‘quasi-concepts’ and the differentially available ‘power to conceptualize’.  The 
discomfort with concepts are no doubt rooted in a discomfort with sovereign truth of the 
writer, and more subtly, even with the sovereignty of the reader.  It is then not sufficient to 
shift the weight of concept onto the metaphor, or to say that concepts are always also 
metaphors.  Skaria is adamant that a turn to metaphor does not loosen up the problem of 
textual sovereignty.  One continues to wonder then what kind of concepts, concept-metaphors, 
or metaphor-allegories, can bear the weight of non-thought and non-knowledge that is the 
horizon of the satyagrahi? 
 
 
 
